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CASE NOTES
exception to section 7. The problem arises primarily from Congress' vague
allusion to International Shoe. The Congress, then, should act to resolve this
issue of its own making. The courts and Commission should not engraft an
exception to the present section 7 on the infirm ground of either an aging
decision under the pre-1950 section 7, or of meager congressional reference
to that decision.
JOSEPH C. TANSKI
Labor Law—Labor-Management Relations Act—Remedial Power of
the National Labor Relations Board—Award of Fringe Benefits.—
NLRB v. Strong .'—Defendant Strong was a member of a multi-employer
bargaining association which negotiated a collective bargaining agreement
with the Roofers Union of Southern California. Strong attempted to withdraw
from the association after the agreement became effective, and refused to sign
the agreement. The union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations Board, and the Board found that Strong's refusal to sign the
agreement constituted an unfair labor practice under sections 8(a) (5) and (1)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act? The Board issued an order requiring
the defendant to cease and desist from unfair labor practices, to sign the agree-
ment, to post notices and to "pay to the appropriate source any fringe
benefits provided for in the ... contract.” 3 The order did not provide for any
back pay payments. 4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the
Board's order except for the provision requiring the payment of fringe bene-
fits. The court stated that
[t1 he order of the Board requiring the payment of fringe benefits
to the appropriate source is an order to respondent to carry out
provisions of the contract and is beyond the power of the Board. 5
Although the court did not elaborate, it impliedly held that the Board had
no power to award fringe benefits under Section 10(c) of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act. 6 That section provides in part that the Board
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring
such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and
to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari? to consider whether the Board was
empowered under section 10(c) to award fringe benefits to remedy an unfair
labor practice. The Court reversed and HELD: The Board is empowered by
1 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), (1) (1964).
152 N.L.R.B. 9, 14 (1965).
4 The employees apparently continued working during the unfair labor practice.
This possibility is more fully discussed infra at p. 1023.
5 NLRB v. Strong, 386 F.2d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 1968).
6 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
7 391 U.S. 933 (1968).
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section 10(c) to order the retroactive payment of fringe benefits to remedy an
unfair labor practice.
The majority, speaking through Mr. Justice White, had little trouble in
viewing the award of fringe benefits as sanctioned by section 10(c) even
though the contract provided for arbitration. 8 This conclusion rested on a
three-step argument. The Court first pointed out that the policy of the Act
underlying a remedial order is to make the worker whole.° Secondly, the ma-
jority reasoned that although the Board does not have plenary authority to
interpret the collective bargaining agreement, the Board is empowered to
find an unfair labor practice even though the same act constitutes a breach
of the contract which would give rise to a section 301 suit. 1° The majority
further noted that the Board is empowered to reinstate an employee with
back pay, and that to award back pay the Board must of necessity construe
the contract. Therefore, the Court concluded that the award of fringe bene-
fits, because it is a logical supplement to back pay, is within the remedial
power of the Board.
Mr. Justice Black, though concurring in the reversal of the court of
appeals decision, felt that the case should be remanded to the Board for a de-
termination whether the issue of fringe benefits should be submitted to arbi-
tration. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented. Relying on his prior opinions in sup-
port of arbitration," he viewed the decision as a renunciation of the Court's
policy favoring that method of resolving disputes. According to Justice
Douglas, "fringe benefits are not products of a computer but of an arbitral
process to which Congress has given strong support."' 2 He argued that a
fair solution would most probably result from reliance on the arbitrator's
knowledge of the "common law of the shop.m 3
The majority in Strong reached the result on the strength of an argu-
ment grounded on the Board's power to interpret collective bargaining agree-
ments in certain situations. This result, furthermore, would clearly appear to
be a proper one. However, it is arguable that the Court should have reviewed
the Board's discretionary power to remedy unfair labor practices. The ma-
8 "The appropriate method for the settlement of this contractual dispute is the
grievance-arbitration procedure set out clearly in the agreement itself." Brief for Re-
spondent at 4-5.
9 See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941).
19 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197
(1962), the Court stated, "The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor
practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301,
but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under
§ 301."
11 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion in four of the most significant
cases dealing with arbitration. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 567-69 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578-83 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596-99 (1960) ; Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455-59 (1957).
12 393 U.S. at 363.
43 For a discussion of the "common law of the shop" and its role in the interpreta-
tion of collective bargaining agreements see United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960); Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration,
72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1493-98 (1959).
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jority would then have been in a position to address itself to Justice Douglas'
contention that the result impinges on arbitration. This case note will first
examine the Board's discretionary power bearing on the award of fringe
benefits. In the light of such a review, the question whether the decision
abrogates the Court's policy of fostering arbitration is more readily resolved.
The policy underlying the Board's discretionary power to remedy unfair
labor practices is briefly mentioned by the majority as "making the worker
whole." That policy is explicitly stated in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 14
where the Court upheld the Board's power under section 10(c) to reinstate
a worker with back pay. The Court stated that
[m]aking the workers whole for losses suffered on account of
an unfair labor practice is part of the vindication of the public
policy which the Board enforces. Since only actual losses should be
made good, it seems fair that deductions should be made not only
for actual earnings by the worker but also for losses which he will-
fully incurred. 15
This passage limits the Board's remedial power by putting any punitive
award beyond its power." In order to determine whether the award of
fringe benefits is punitive, the actual nature of the fringe benefits in Strong
must be examined. Although the Court did not specify the nature of the
fringe benefits, the contract apparently required the employer to make pay-
ments to the union's health and welfare trust fund, vacation benefits trust
fund, and an apprenticeship and training fund. A portion of these pay-
ments was deductible from the employees' wages and the remainder, based
on the number of hours worked by the employee, 17 was contributed by the
employer. It can be assumed that the Board would have little trouble in
computing the benefits because the employees apparently continued to work
after the employer's refusal to sign the contract's Thus the number of hours
worked, a figure needed to compute the benefits, was available to the Board.
Since the benefits were explicitly provided for in the contract and easily
14 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
15 Id. at 197-98. Cf. Nathanson v. Trustee in Bankruptcy v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27
(1952).
10 See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). In that case the
Court refused to enforce the Board's order requiring the employer to cancel certain con-
tracts with the union, stating that
ftThe power to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive, and
is to be exercised in aid of the Board's authority to restrain violations and as a
means of removing or avoiding the consequences of violation where those con- .
sequences are of a kind to thwart the purposes of the Act.
305 U.S. at 236. See also Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940), where the
Court denied enforcement of the Board's order requiring the employer to pay to certain
governmental agencies amounts which the reinstated employees had received for work
upon "work relief projects" on the basis that the Board's "power to command affirma-
tive action is remedial, not punitive." 311 U.S. at 12.
17 Brief for Petitioner at 3.
18 There is no indication in the Board's decision, the circuit court decision, or the
Supreme Court decision that the employees stopped working at any time during the
unfair labor practice.
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computable, it is highly unlikely that the award could be considered puni-
tive." The fact that the benefits were explicit in the contract also provides
a possible rebuttal to Justice Douglas' contention. If the thrust of his argu-
ment is that an arbitrator's determination of the fringe benefits payable
under the contract would be different from the Board's computation, 2° it is
arguable that the arbitrator could not have reached a different result 2 1
Furthermore, in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,22
Justice Douglas stated that an arbitrator's award of back pay "is legitimate
only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment."23 The primary function of the arbitrator, then, according to Justice
Douglas, is to interpret the collective bargaining agreement. In Strong
the fringe benefits were explicit on the face of the agreement. Consequently,
it is arguable that "past practices" or the "common law of the shop" were
not relevant to the determination of the fringe benefits payable in Strong.
With the policy of making the worker whole without including punitive
amounts as the basic guideline for the Board's discretion, an examination of
the substantive remedial power embodied in section 10(c) is required to de-
termine whether the award of the specific fringe benefits in Strong falls
within the Board's power. It is unclear from a reading of the majority
opinion whether the Court considered the fringe benefits as "back pay," thus
bringing the award within the express authorization of section 10(c). 24 The
specific authorization of "reinstatement with or without back pay," how-
ever, does not constitute an implied limitation on the type of affirmative
action which the Board may take. In Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB 25
the Court upheld the Board's order requiring the disestablishment of a union
organized by the employer in violation of Section 8 of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act. In conjunction with this order the Board required the
company to return to the employees any "check-off" 26 dues paid to the
union. In sustaining this order, the Court observed that
[t]he Board has wide discretion in ordering affirmative action; its
power is not limited to the illustrative example of one type of per-
missible affirmative order, namely, reinstatement with or without
back pay. The particular means by which the effects of unfair labor
19 Cf. Exchange Parts Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1965), enforcing the
Board's award of a unilaterally terminated Christmas bonus.
20 This interpretation is suggested by Justice Douglas' statement in Strong that
"what 'past practices' might reflect on the amount of an award . .. in an arbitration
frame of reference, no one knows." 393 U.S. at 366.
21 On the arbitrator's duty to apply the terms of the contract, see generally B.
Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev.
545 (1967).
22 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
23 Id. at 597.
24 For a complete discussion of the "back pay" remedy see R. Fuchs & H. Kelleher,
The Back-Pay Remedy of the National Labor Relations Board, 9 B.C. Ind. & 'Com. L.
Rev. 829 (1968).
25 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
26 "Check-off" dues are deducted from the employees' pay by the employer and
paid to the union directly by the employer.
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practices are to be expunged are matters "for the Board not the
courts to determine." 27 (Citations omitted.)
This discretionary power to remedy an unfair labor practice was reaffirmed
in NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.28 In that case the Court upheld the
Board's Computation of a back pay award by the "quarterly method,"29 and
reasoned that
[i]n fashioning remedies to undo the effects of violations of the Act,
the Board must draw on enlightenment gained from experience.
When the Board, "in the exercise of its informed discretion," makes
an order of restoration by way of back pay, the order "should stand
unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve
ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the
policies of the Act."""
It is apparent from the Court's reasoning in these two cases that if the
fringe benefits in Strong were necessary to make the worker whole, then the
Board acted within its discretionary power by including them in the order.
Fringe benefits, as a part of the consideration given for the employees'
services, should certainly be appropriate in making the worker whole. An
examination of the decisions of the circuit courts reveals that the Board's
awards of fringe benefits have been upheld as either "back pay" 31 or "affirma-
tive action' 12 necessary to compensate the worker fully. However, all the
circuit decisions uncovered involved payments directly to the worker. In
Strong the Board's order required payment to the "appropriate source." By
implication it would appear that the Board contemplated that the employer
would pay the trustees or administrators of the various plans. if such were
the case, it might be inappropriate to term the order a "back pay" order,
for that phrase connotes payments made directly to the worker in the form
of wages.
27 319 U.S. at 539.
28 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
22 This method was first employed and explained by the Board in F.W. Woolworth
Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950).
30 344 U.S. at 346-47. Cf. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607
(1966), where the Court recognized the limited scope of review of an agency's discre-
tionary remedial order under § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009(e) (1964).
al E.g., in W.C. Nabors v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
911 (1964), the court upheld the Board's order to pay the employee his share of a profit
sharing plan. The court reasoned that
"(black pay" as used in section 10(c) includes the moneys, whether gratuitous or
not, which it is reasonably found (by the Board] that the employee would actu-
ally have received in the absence of unlawful discrimination.
323 F.2d at 690. In NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569 (5th Cir.
1966), the court held that "I al safe-driving award which an employee would have earned
absent unlawful discrimination is includible in backpay." Id. at 572.
32 E.g., in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 339 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1965), the court
enforced the Board's order requiring the employer to pay a unilaterally terminated Christ-
mas bonus. The court reasoned that § 10(c) "warranted an order requiring payment of
the bonus in a case such as this, as 'such affirmative action * * * as will effectuate the
politics of this subchapter.'" Id. at 831.
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The Supreme Court, however, has also stated that the Board's order, in
making the worker whole, should bring a "restoration of the situation, as
nearly as possible, to that which would have obtained but for the illegal dis-
crimination."33 This "return to the status quo" reasoning establishes a "but
for" test to determine the affirmative action required to make the worker
whole. The restoration theory would certainly encompass fringe benefit pay-
ments to the various plans, for these would have been made but for the
employers unfair labor practice of refusal to sign the contract.
An illustration of this theory of restoration is found in NLRB v. Rice
Lake Creamery Co 34 In that case, as a result of an unfair labor practice
and a subsequent strike, the Board ordered reinstatement with back pay. In
addition the order required the employer to pay the premiums for a pension
insurance plan directly to the employees because on the facts of the case
they could be considered wages. Although the back pay order was remanded,•'
the award of the pension insurance premiums was upheld:" A third part of
the order, concerning a group medical and hospital plan, illustrates not only
the wide area encompassed by the restoration theory of making the worker
whole but also the breadth of the Board's discretion. The employer had dis-
continued paying the premiums on the group medical plan during the strike.
Three employees had incurred medical and hospital expenses during the
strike, and the Board's order required the employer to reimburse them for
these expenses. The court sustained this part of the order, reasoning that
since they would have received the expenses except for the unfair
labor practice, the loss is one which the Board validly included in
the amounts required to make them whole?'
The court modified the award, however, by allowing the employer to deduct
from the individual back pay awards the health and medical premiums that
each employee would have paid. It reasoned that, if the Board decides to
treat the employer as an insurer because of his unfair labor practice, the
risk should be spread among all the workers as it was under the discontinued
plan.38
In light of the Supreme Court's previous endorsement of the Board's
discretion in remedying unfair labor practices, and of the circuit court de-
cisions passing on the question of fringe benefits, the Board clearly has the
power under section 10(c) to award fringe benefits. Mr. justice Douglas,
however, is not willing to sanction the Board's exercise of its discretionary
remedial power when arbitration presents an alternative method for resolving
the dispute. He holds the position that the policy of fostering arbitration
33 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941),
34 365 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
35 Id. at 896.
36 Id. at 892.
37 Id. at 893.
38 Id. It should be noted that this reasoning would require the employees in Strong
to pay their portion of the fringe benefits or would reduce the employer's liability to
only the amount which he was required to contribute.
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requires that arbitration take precedence over the Board's power to interpret
the contract to remedy an unfair labor practice.
The case reader is thus left in a quandry, for the majority opinion fails
to answer the two probing questions implicit in Justice Douglas' dissent:
(1) why arbitration is not the proper method of resolving the fringe benefits
issue; and (2) whether the decision abrogates the Court's continued support
of arbitration. A response to these two questions begins with the inquiry
whether the arbitration clause covers the fringe benefits issue. 3" Neither the
majority nor the dissenter, however, discuss the nature of the arbitration
clause. In reliance upon the dissent, it will be assumed that the arbitration
clause would apply. 4 °
The logic implicit in Justice Douglas' opinion is that, once the Board
orders the employer to sign the contract, the arbitration clause embodied in
the contract becomes effective. Since the arbitration clause represents the
method adopted by the parties for resolving contractual disputes, the Board
should have no power to interpret the contract because, under the contract,
that function is delegated to the arbitrator. 41 If the Board had simply ordered
the contract signed, for example, it is likely that a section 301 suit by the
union to recover the fringe benefits would not lie until the union fulfilled its -
obligation to arbitrate!'
The argument that the fringe benefits question should be decided by
arbitration is, of course, strengthened by the policy of the Supreme Court to
favor arbitration as an important method of resolving grievances. That policy
is based on Section 1 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 43 which states
that the purpose of the Act is to promote the free flow of commerce "by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." Further-
more, in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 44 the Su-
preme Court stated that "arbitration of labor disputes under collective bar-
39 If the arbitration clause did not cover the fringe benefits issue, then NLRB v.
C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967), would appear to support the proposition that
the decision does not impinge on arbitration. In upholding the Board's ability to interpret
the contract in C & C Plywood, the Court stated:
[fit is important to first point out that the collective bargaining agreement con-
tained no arbitration clause. The contract did provide grieVance procedures,
but the end result of those procedures, if differences between the parties remained
unresolved, was economic warfare, not "the therapy of arbitration." Thus, the
Board's action in this case was in no way inconsistent with its previous recog-
nition of arbitration as "an instrument of national labor policy for composing
contractual differences."
Id. at 426 (citations omitted).
40 See also Brief for Respondent at 4-5.
41 See H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947), which states:
Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract, the enforcement of that
contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National
Labor Relations Board.
See also Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 386 U.S. 502, 510-13 (1962).
42 Cf. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960).
43 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
44 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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gaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process
itself."45 Thus the Court has placed arbitration directly within the stated
purpose of the Act.46
The majority opinion does not adequately cope with the arbitration
argument raised by Justice Douglas' dissent. The cases cited by the majority
provide precedent for the position that the Board has discretionary power
to interpret the contract, but the cases do not support a theory that the
Board's discretionary power takes precedence over arbitration. 47 Although it
is not cited by the majority, the only prior case decided by the Court dealing
with the conflict between arbitration and the power of the Board is NLRB v.
Acme Indus. Co.48 In that case the Board ordered the employer to disclose
information sought by the union, even though arbitration of the dispute over
disclosure was pending. The Court upheld the order and noted that more
overlap exists in the relationship of the Board to arbitration than in the
relationship between the courts and arbitration. 49 However, it upheld the
Board's order only on the basis that it "decided nothing about the merits
of the union's contractual claims."" In Strong the award of fringe benefits
conclusively determined the merits of the union's contractual claim. The
decision in Strong, therefore, goes a step beyond Acme.
The Sixth Circuit, in Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 51 refused
to allow the Board to take this additional step. The court rejected the
Board's attempt to change the amount of a Christmas bonus when the con-
tract contained grievance procedures. 52 It recognized that the Board has
broad discretionary powers to remedy unfair labor practices but reasoned that
the Board's
broad powers were originally given to the Board to aid in effectuat-
ing a national legislative policy of encouraging collective bargain-
ing, rather than to assist in adjudicating relatively minor disputes
between parties with a settled and amicable collective bargaining
relationship. 53
This language provides the key to resolution of the questions implicit
in Justice Douglas' dissent. It is important to note that in Beacon the court
45 Id, at 578.
46 See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 (1964), where the
Court recognized "the central role of arbitration in effectuating national labor policy."
See also cases cited at note 11 supra.
47 E.g., NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 423 (1967) (no arbitration
clause) ; Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964) (authorizing a
court order compelling arbitration though the dispute was arguably a representational
one within the jurisdiction of the Board); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195,
196 n.1 (1962) (no arbitration clause); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Corp., 369
U.S. 95 (1962) (affirming damage award for business losses incident to a strike called
by the union in violation of its contractual obligation to arbitrate the dispute).
48 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
40 Id. at 436-37.
50 Id. at 437.
51 401 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1968).
52 It is not clear whether the contract provided for arbitration.
53 401 F.2d at 368.
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relied on the fact that the dispute was minor and an amicable collective
bargaining relationship existed. When an amicable bargaining relationship
exists, arbitration may settle the dispute quickly and promote a healthier
relationship between the parties than would an order imposing that settle-
ment.54
 If an amicable collective bargaining relationship is a criterion for
refusal to enforce the Board's order, 55 then the facts in Strong must be
examined to determine whether the nature of the dispute and the relationship
of the parties warranted the Board's order requiring the payment of fringe
benefits.
The defendant in Strong not only refused to sign the contract but liti-
gated the issue for a period covering six years. Once the defendant was
forced to sign the contract, moreover, he attempted to utilize the arbi-
tration clause in the contract to avoid compliance with the award of fringe
benefits. This conduct evidences the fact that the defendant was not inclined
toward amicable collective bargaining. Other facts in the case support further
speculation on the defendant's willingness to bargain in good faith with the
union. It can be assumed that the employees continued to work throughout
the period of the unfair labor practice, for the Board's order did not provide
for reinstatement or back pay and no evidence exists to the contrary." The
only cash outlay required of the employer by the Board's order was the pay-
ment of fringe benefits to the appropriate source. These facts, combined with
the fact that the Board appealed the issue to the Supreme Court, suggest the
conclusion that the defendant's refusal to sign the contract rested directly on
his objection to the benefit plans which it established. This possibility leads
in turn to a conclusion that the loss of the fringe benefits was the only direct
result of the employer's unfair labor practice of refusal to sign the contract.
Although these conclusions are somewhat speculative, the factual situa-
tion in its entirety negates any inference that the employer would have
arbitrated in good faith or accepted an arbitration award without resorting
to further litigation. This possibility brings into play a third policy and tips
the balance of conflicting policy considerations toward the result reached by
the majority. That third policy calls for the resolution of grievances as quickly
as possible 5i If the Board had simply required the employer to sign the
agreement and arbitrate in good faith, the facts in Strong suggest that the
order would have been ineffectual in ending the conflict, and that the union
54 See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), where the Court
stated that
11)ly allowing the dispute to go to arbitration its fragmentation is avoided
to a substantial extent; and those conciliatory measures [brought about by arbi-
tration] which Congress deemed vital to "industrial peace" and which may be
dispositive of the entire dispute, are encouraged.
Id. at 272.
55 The Board itself has refused to grant relief and relied instead on private settle-
ment of the dispute by the parties. See, e.g., New Orleans Bd. of Trade, Ltd., 152 N.L.R.B.
1258 (1965).
56 This result may be explained by the fact that the defendant was engaged in a
relatively minor operation with most employees working only part time. See Brief for
Respondent at 2.
57 See 9 B.C. Ind. Sr Com. L. Rev. 497, 501 (1968).
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would have confronted a significant delay in obtaining relief. The Supreme
Court in NLRB v. C & C Plywood" recognized the importance of a quick
resolution of grievances. The Court stated that
[i]f the Board in a case like this had no jurisdiction to con-
sider a collective agreement prior to an authoritative construction
by the courts, labor organizations would face inordinate delays in
obtaining vindication of their statutory rights . 5 °
Although C & C Plywood did not involve an arbitration clause, the
distinct likelihood of delay in Strong would appear to make the Court's
reasoning applicable. Because the Board's order in Strong effectuates a policy
against inordinate delay and is within the Board's discretionary power, the
decision cannot properly be considered to be in derogation of arbitration.
In all probability, arbitration would have extended the existing industrial
strife, a result contrary to the avowed function of arbitration to expedite
industrial settlements.
Strong is a significant decision because it extends the discretionary power
of the Board one step beyond the decision in Acme. The Board is now clearly
empowered to interpret the contract to remedy an unfair labor practice even
though the contract provides for arbitration. This power is certainly proper
and necessary in situations like Strong. Unfortunately, however, the case is
subject to an interpretation that the Board may construe the contract to
remedy an unfair labor practice in any situation, regardless of arbitration.
In situations where an amicable collective bargaining relationship exists and
where the fringe benefits are not clear on the face of the contract, arbitration
would appear to be the preferable forum for resolving the dispute. To the extent
that the opinion may be utilized by the Board or by the courts as a carte
blanche authorization of the Board to decide all contract issues incidental to
an unfair labor practice, the policy of fostering arbitration could be signifi-
cantly weakened. To avoid this possibility, the majority should have set
forth more clearly the guidelines and considerations which the Board must
follow in cases where its power to remedy unfair labor practices and arbitra-
tion present alternative methods of resolving the dispute. These considera-
tions, as discussed above, revolve around the ease of interpreting the con-
tract, the likelihood of inordinate delay, and especially the relationship of the
parties.
KURT M. SWENSON
Securities Regulation — Insurance — McCarran-Ferguson Act — State
Statute Reguldting Merger Does Not Preclude Operation of Federal Se-
curities Law.—SEC v. National Sec., Inc. 1—The Securities and Exchange
58 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
58 Id. at 429.
1 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Marshall.
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